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We have been invited to open the symposium in this volume of the UK
Supreme Court Yearbook with some reflections on the Miller litigation,
taking as our starting point our blog post, Pulling the Article 50 Trigger:
Parliament's Indispensable Role (`the blog post').1 As self-indulgent as it is
to accept this invitation, it provides a useful opportunity to set-out the
background and provide the context to the Miller litigation, before setting
out our thoughts on the judgments of the Divisional Court and the UK
Supreme Court (`the Supreme Court') themselves. Part I of this chapter
examines the context, Part II explores the reasoning of the Divisional
Court2 and the Supreme Court3 and Part III provides some conclusions
regarding theMiller litigation.
1 The Path toMiller
1.1 Parliament's Indispensable Role
The blog post was never intended to set-out an argument to be deployed
in litigation. When we published it a few days after the referendum result,
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we did not think that litigation was necessary, or even likely. We were
hoping, naively, that the Government would either recognise that a statute
was needed before art 50 of theTreaty onEuropeanUnion (`theTEU') could
be triggered, or at least recognise that an Act of Parliament was in its, and
the country's, interests. The need for legislationwould slow down the art 50
process at a time of political crisis within the UK and provide much needed
breathing space for political actors. The blog post, of course, also sought
to identify those constitutional principles that required observance, and, if
the Government failed to observe them, it sought to give Parliament an
argument it could use against the Government to protect its position in the
Brexit process. In short, we were seeking to make a legal contribution to a
political crisis, not to light the touch-paper of litigation.4
The blog post that we published on Monday, 27 June 2016, argued that the
existence of the European Communities Act 1972 (`the ECA 1972' and `the
1972 Act') entailed that primary legislation was required to empower the
Government to trigger art 50 of theTEU.Thiswas because the consequence
of triggering art 50 would be to withdraw the UK from the European
Union (EU) and would strip the 1972 Act of its intended effect, namely,
to give effect to our membership of the EU, most notably the rights and
obligations flowing therefrom. Animating our argument was the principle
of representative democracy, which entailed that in the UK a constitutional
change of such moment should only be effected by primary legislation. As
we stated, the arguments that an Act of Parliament was necessary ranged
from the general to the specific, but `[a]t the most general, our democracy is
a parliamentary democracy, and it is Parliament, not the Government, that
has the final say about the implications of the referendum, the timing of an
Article 50 [notice,] our membership of the Union, and the rights of British
citizens that flow from that membership.'5 We identified two common
law rules governing the relationship between statute and the prerogative,
each of which led, we argued, to the conclusion that a statute was required,
and each of which amounted to a working-through of the more general
constitutional principle of representative democracy in the substance of the
4 It was Lord Pannick QC's endorsement of the blog post's argument in his column
in The Times a few days later that ensured that the contention that there had to
be an Act of Parliament was taken seriously and provoked wider discussion includ-
ing in Parliament and letters to the press: David Pannick QC, `Why giving no-
tice of withdrawal from the EU requires act of Parliament' The Times (London, 30
June 2016) <www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-giving-notice-of-withdrawal-from-the-eu-
requires-act-of-parliament-dz7s85dmw> accessed 10 August 2017. An excellent overview
and collection of the various views that were expressed at the time is found in: Nicola
Newson `Leaving the EU: Parliament's Role in the process' (House of Lords Library Note
LLN-2016-0034, 4 July 2016), 1-7 <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBrief-
ing/Summary/LLN-2016-0034> accessed 10 August 2017.
5 Barber, Hickman and King (n 1).
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common law.
First, there was the `frustration' argument, which was grounded in a
purposive reading of the text of the 1972 Act, including its long title.
In the Fire Brigades Union Case, the House of Lords had held that the
prerogative could not be used in a manner that frustrated a statute, even
if the prerogative power was not directly addressed by the statute.6 The
blog post argued that the purpose and effect of the 1972 Act is to provide
for the UK's membership of the EU and for the EU Treaties to have effect
in domestic law. The triggering of art 50 would cut directly across that
statutory purpose and render the Act a dead letter: it would remain on the
statute book but it could not achieve the purpose for which Parliament put
it there.
The second, complementary, argument was the `rights' argument. One of
the earliest formulations of this is found in a classic case of the common
law: The Case of Proclamations.7 The principle is a simple one: where statute
has conferred a legal right, the prerogative cannot be used to take that right
away. The triggering of art 50 of the TEU will have the effect of stripping
British citizens of the rights they now enjoy by virtue of the ECA 1972, ergo
this can only be done by an Act of Parliament.
We anticipated that some might argue that the 1972 Act only gave effect
to EU law rights that `from time to time' were in existence and that,
as a consequence, the triggering of art 50 would not result in the loss
of statutory rights (but, instead, only in the loss of European rights the
domestic effect of which was dependent on continued membership of the
EU). For the same reasons, we thought they might argue, art 50 would
not frustrate the statutory purpose of the ECA 1972. However, we found
this argument to be unpersuasive as the `from time to time' provision in
s 2 of the 1972 Act is intended to reflect the evolving nature of EU law
within the EU and not the possibility of the removal of EU rights or UK
membership altogether. We also noted that the European Parliamentary
Elections Act 2002 unequivocally confers statutory rights on British citizens
that will be rendered nugatory as a result of withdrawal from the EU; it
contains no `from time to time' provision. The subsequent decisions of
the courts on the significance of the 1972 Act rendered discussion of the
2002 Act largely unnecessary, but it remained as a second, and in some
ways clearer, application of the `rights' principle. The blog post, thus,
argued that pre-existing, clear, well-established, legal principles, grounded
in the fundamental structure of the constitution, meant that legislation was
6 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] UKHL 3, [1995]
2 AC 513.
7 (1610) 12 Co Rep 74.
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needed before art 50 was triggered. The consequence of this reasoning
was that there was a constitutionally and politically important intermediary
stage between the referendum and giving notice of the UK's intention to
leave the EU under art 50 of the TEU.
Although we did not address the European Union Referendum Act 2015
in our blog post, the background context was that the 2015 Act had
not authorised the UK Government to take any steps consequent on any
particular result. It simply said that a referendum shall be held. The effect
of that was to gauge the popular will. Indeed, the 2015 Act contrasts sharply
with the legislation establishing the 2011 alternative vote referendum,
which did determine the conduct of Ministers in the event of a positive
result.8 With hindsight, the general reader of the blog post would certainly
have benefited from an explanation of this point. Many thought that the
outcome of the vote immediately and necessarily triggered our exit from the
Union or provided authority to the Government to affect such exit. But in
a representative rather than direct democracy, it is for Parliament to specify
how the results of referendums are received.
1.2 The Reaction of the Government
Recall Friday 24 June 2017. The then Prime Minister, David Cameron,
stood on the steps of Downing Street, facing the world with news of how
Her Majesty's Government would react to the outcome of the referendum.
Contrary to his previous statements about the consequences of losing the
referendum, the PrimeMinister announced that he would not be triggering
art 50 of the TEU. Rather, he announced his resignation and said that
triggering art 50 would now be a matter for his successor. It was obvious to
everybody, not least the Government, that there was no plan for exiting the
EU. The brakes were being applied. The Government, it was clear, needed
to buy time. But more than that, it was clear to us that the implications of
triggering art 50 of the TEU could be disastrous. As the blog post explained,
the art 50 process stacks the negotiating deck of cards in favour of the EU
Member States by cutting the exiting Member State adrift without any exit
deal two years after art 50 notification has been given if no agreement has
been reached and there is no unanimous consent of the EuropeanCouncil to
extend the two-year negotiating period. That inevitably places an exiting
State under enormous pressure to accept whatever is put on the table by
the remaining Member States and allows them to control the timing of
negotiations. There had been little or no discussion of these consequences
of triggering art 50 at the time because few front-bench politicians or
8 Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011, s 8.
215
2016–2017 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 8
commentators seem to have thought the outcome of the referendumwould
be a vote to leave the EU.
And yet the EU institutions and other Member States understood the
position perfectly well. Rather than allowing the British Government a
period to regroup, there were demands for art 50 of the TEU to be triggered
right away, and an insistence that there would be no negotiations before
art 50 was invoked. There was even a suggestion floated in the press that
efforts would be made to get David Cameron to trigger art 50 over dinner
at a European Council meeting to be held on Tuesday, 28 June 2016.9 In
this context, the argument that the Prime Minister simply had no power
to trigger art 50 was important: irrespective of the pressure brought by our
European negotiating partners, David Cameron simply lacked the power to
initiate the art 50 process. This constraint on the powers of the Executive
might have been a welcome obstacle rather than a constitutional irritant for
a number of reasons.
First, it could have provided a legitimate basis for buying time. That
a Member State's executive branch might find itself constrained in such
circumstances by internal constitutional requirements would not have
been remarkable and would surely have been understood in many other
European capitals. After all, the European Union's trade deal with Canada,
painstakingly negotiated over seven years, was delayed by the need for
approval from the Wallonia legislature, a region of Belgium. Given that
the Wallonian Parliament must approve Belgium's agreement to a trade
deal before it can be concluded by the European Union, it would hardly
have been surprising had exit from the EU required approval of the UK
Parliament.
Secondly, it could have provided a basis for seeking to obtain commitments
of some form from the other EU Member States prior to triggering art
50 of the TEU. The Government could have relied upon the need to get
parliamentary approval as a basis for seeking to secure some assurances
either of substantive or procedural nature before art 50 was triggered. The
referendum result did not speak to the question of how to leave the EU
or even on what terms. Parliament, then, had in our view a potentially
important role. As we argued in our blog post:
Parliament could conclude that it would be contrary to the
national interest to invoke Article 50 whilst it is in the dark
9 See John Henley, Jennifer Rankin and Patrick Wintour `EU may refuse infor-
mal Brexit talks until UK triggers article 50' The Guardian (London, 27 June
2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/26/eu-may-refuse-informal-brexit-talks-
until-uk-triggers-article-50> accessed 10 August 2017.
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about what the key essentials of the new relationship with
the EU are going to be, and without knowing what terms the
EU is going to offer. Parliament might well conclude that
to require the Government to issue the notice immediately
would be contrary to the national interest, even if Parliament
is committed to leaving the EU, because the legal structure of
Article 50 would place the UK at a seriously disadvantageous
position in negotiating acceptable terms. Surely, Parliament
is unlikely to require the Government to issue notice under
Article 50 if it considers that the Government might be forced
to accept exit terms which do not protect key aspects of our
economy. Parliament may therefore require the Government
to engage in extensive informal negotiations or even to seek
to negotiate exit from the EU by formal Treaty amendments
rather than through the Article 50 process.10
The potential advantages of that argument were, however, never taken-up
by the Government or, in the end, by Parliament. The Government's
position on whether an Act of Parliament was necessary before triggering
art 50 of the TEU was not initially made explicit, but eventually statements
made in Parliament and then in the course of the Miller litigation made it
clear that the Government did not accept that an Act of Parliament was
required. On 24 June 2016, David Cameron had stated that, `I think it is
right that [the] newPrimeMinister takes the decision aboutwhen to trigger
Article 50 […]',11 however at this stage the need for legislation was not
contemplated. It was not until 18 July 2016 that Lord Bridges of Headley,
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for Exiting the
EU, stated in Parliament that, `[t]he Government's position is that there is
no legal obligation to consult Parliament on triggering Article 50.'12 The
following day at a directions hearing, the Divisional Court directed the
Government to respond to arguments advanced by theMiller and de Santos
claimants, and, on 25 July 2017, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU
(`the Secretary of State') confirmed the Government's view that an Act
was `not needed' to commence the art 50 process.13 Horns were therefore
locked, and the issue was destined for the Divisional Court; and ultimately
for the Supreme Court.14
10 Barber, Hickman and King (n 1).
11 David Cameron, `EU referendum outcome' (PM statement from 10 Downing Street, Lon-
don, 24 June 2016) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-referendum-outcome-pm-
statement-24-june-2016> accessed 10 August 2017.
12 HL Deb 18 July 2016, vol 774, col 430.
13 Letter from the Government Legal Department to the Divisional Court (15 July 2016).
14 Mishcon de Reya solicitors had written to the Government on 27 June 2016 seeking
217
2016–2017 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 8
It need not have been this way. It is interesting to speculate on why
the Government did not simply agree to put a bill before Parliament,
even if it considered there was no legal obligation on it to do so. In
the months following the referendum, as later events proved, it would
not have encountered great difficulty in procuring the passage of such an
Act, although it may not have wanted to take the risk of a rebellion by
remainer Conservative MPs. Prime Minister Cameron no doubt did not
want to tie the hands of his successor. When Theresa May took the helm
it became clear that she intended to concentrate decision making power
in the Government and was cautious, to say the least, about informing
Parliament about her objectives in the Brexit process. By November 2016,
freshly elected in the Conservative Party's post-referendum leadership
contest, the Prime Minister was not only proposing to invoke art 50 of
the TEU unilaterally but was refusing to answer any questions about the
Government's position on the wide spectrum of options for a post-EU UK
on the floor of the House.15 Introducing a Bill would certainly have put her
under greater pressure to reveal her hand. Perhaps too, the Government's
position reflected an age-old and instinctive reaction of the Government
and the civil service to defend the realm of prerogative power. There may
well have been a sense that to accept the argument would have been to
concede ground to Parliament in the sensitive area of foreign relations and
treatymaking, and this could have had consequences in terms of the gradual
increase in parliamentary involvement in the ratification of treaties.16
assurances on behalf of unnamed clients that art 50 of the TEU would not be triggered
without a Parliamentary vote, but at this point no argument that an Act of Parliament was
required was advanced or developed. This changed after Lord Pannick QC was instructed
(together with one of the present authors) by Mishcon de Reya on 31 June 2016 following
Lord Pannick's column in The Times (see n 5), in a team also including Rhodri Thompson
QC, Anneli Howard and later Professor Dan Sarooshi. A claim by Deir dos Santos, the
hairdresser who voted for Brexit, was also brought and was joined to that of Gina Miller,
with Ms Miller's claim subsequently designated by the Divisional Court as the lead claim.
15 See eg Rob Merrick `Theresa May faces growing anger over Brexit secrecy as
Boris Johnson appears to leak key detail' The Independent (London, 16 Novem-
ber 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-theresa-may-plans-boris-
johnson-customs-union-single-market-latest-a7420926.html> accessed 10 August 2017 ;
BBC News `Jeremy Corbyn calls for more transparency over Brexit plan' BBC (London, 5
November 2016) <www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37880603> accessed 10 August 2017.
See HC Deb 7 December 2016, vol 618 col 220 (Sir Keir Starmer).
16 See the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010; and European Union Act 2011.
The Secretary of State accepted in Miller that it was the Government's `usual practice' to
ensure implementing legislation is enacted before a governing treaty is ratified: Skeleton
Argument, p 10, n 13. The Government nonetheless argued that examples could be found
of theUKwithdrawing from treaties that had been implemented in domestic law. Only two
examples were, however, ever identified in the course of the litigation, the first was double
taxation treaties (ibid 16, para 36); and the second was withdrawal from the European
Free Trade Agreement when the UK joined the European Communities. Both of those
situations, however, raise distinct legal issues and in any event in neither case had there
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Whatever its motives, the Government's resistance to an Act of Parliament
was resolute. Rather than accepting the judgment of the Divisional Court
handed down in October 2016, the Prime Minister instructed her lawyers
to appeal it, running the risk not only of a further high-profile defeat but
also adverse findings on the devolution issues had not been raised before
the Divisional Court. The Government did, however, eventually agree to
a vote in the House of Commons, which is a quite different matter both
politically and legally from passing an Act of Parliament. Politically, getting
a Bill through Parliament is a far more substantial undertaking because
amendments can be tabled against a Bill, triggering debates and significant
political pressure, and because it has to pass through both Houses. On
7 December 2016, shortly before the hearing in the Supreme Court, the
Commons held a vote on the timetable for triggering art 50 of the TEU
and approved the Government's intention to trigger before the end of
March 2017.17 An arguably important concession was however won by
the opposition on this occasion, and the motion passed called on the Prime
Minister to commit to publishing an outline of her Brexit plans. The vote
was drawn to the SupremeCourt's attention apparently to demonstrate that
Parliament was engaged in the Brexit process. Its legal relevance, however,
was nil.
Then, in January, shortly before the Supreme Court was due to deliver
its verdict (which, according to leaks, the Government expected to lose18)
TheresaMay delivered a lecture inwhich she gave the first significant details
about the Government's Brexit plans.19 The speech was later substantially
reproduced in the White Paper for the European Union (Notification
of Withdrawal) Bill.20 Despite amendments being tabled in the House
of Lords,21 and substantial debates in both Houses – a process that well
been any judicial consideration of the Government's actions.
17 HC Deb 7 December 2016, vol 613, col 220-336.
18 Christopher Hope `Supreme Court Brexit appeal: Judges `heading for split 7.4 decision'
in narrow win for Remain campaigners' The Telegraph (London, 10 December 2016)
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/10/supreme-court-brexit-appeal-judges-heading-
split-7-4-decision/> accessed 10 August 2017.
19 T May, `Speech by Theresa May' (Lecture at Lancaster House, reprinted in The Daily Tele-
graph, London, 17 January 2017) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-
brexit-speech-full/> accessed 10August 2017. The degree towhich the provision of this in-
formation reflected the motion passed by the House of Commons in December and the de-
gree to which it reflected a recognition that an Act would likely be required by the Supreme
Court is a matter of speculation.
20 Department for Exiting the European Union, `The United Kingdom's exit from and new
partnership with the European Union' (Department for Exiting the European Union, Cm
9471, 2 February 2017) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-
exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper> accessed 10 Au-
gust 2017.
21 The amendments, in outline, were to: (1) require the Government to bring forward
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illustrated the substantial political difference between a vote in the House
and passing a Bill - the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill
passedwithout amendment. TheGovernment did however concede during
the passage of the Bill that a further vote in Parliamentwould be held on any
final deal struck with the EU.22 TheMiller case did not, therefore, prevent,
or even delay, Brexit by requiring an Act of Parliament before art 50 of the
TEU was triggered. The part played by the Miller case in the UK's Brexit
process are matters we leave for others, but if nothing else, parliamentary
supremacy was affirmed and the vital role of the courts, and in particular
the role of the Supreme Court, in upholding our constitution was stamped
into public consciousness.
1.3 The role of blogging
Whilst the Internet and blogging have gradually become staples of legal
practice and academia over the past few years, Miller was the first case in
British constitutional history to have been not only shaped by academic
blogs but also extensively and publically discussed over the Internet during
the litigation process. Within the first three days, our blog post was viewed
over 150,000 times.23 The level of interest provides an interesting social
commentary on the feelings of many in the days immediately following
the Brexit result and the extraordinary, desperate, thirst for information
and analysis, as well as hope amongst remainers that Brexit could still be
avoided. However, our blog post proved to be only the first of very many
others, many of which analysed the issue in much more detail than we
had done. Most, but not all, of these blog posts were posted on the UK
Constitutional Law Association Blog. An indication of the way the Miller
case was reflected in the volume of traffic on the blog site is provided by
the following table which shows sharp increases in traffic following the
referendum and then before and after the Divisional Court's judgment and
in the lead-up to the hearing in the Supreme Court:
proposals to secure to persons exercising EU rights in the UK similar or the same rights
after Brexit; and (2) that the approval of both Houses of Parliament would be required on
the outcome of negotiations with the EU but prior to the formation of an international
agreement with the EU. Both proposals were rejected by the Commons `[b]ecause it is not
a matter which needs to be dealt with in the Bill.': HL Deb 13 March 2017, vol 779, col
1709.
22 HC Deb 13 March 2017, vol 623, col 43.
23 Since publication it has been viewed over 220,000 times.
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Source: UK Constitutional Law Group Annual Report 2017
Following the Divisional Court judgment, Miller-related blog posts rou-
tinely obtained over 1,000 views with some getting between 5,000 to
10,000. To put this in wider context, academic contributions posted on the
Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN) online platform, which is regu-
larly used by academics to get contributions into the public domain in ad-
vance of, or as an alternative to, publication in academic journals, have been
described as having `extremely large' access rate figures if they reach the low
hundreds.24 TheMiller-related blog posts reached a wide audience and had
an impact on national discourse. As the UK Constitutional Law Blog's An-
nual Report noted:
[There were]102 Brexit-related posts in 2016, many of which
are re-read and re-tweeted constantly. Blog posts were
referred to in the media in the UK and abroad (e.g. BBC,
CNN, Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent), andwere
relied on extensively in parliamentary papers, discussions, and
in litigation in the Miller case, where all parties submitted
UKCLA blog posts in their bundles and several were referred
to in discussion.
HadMiller been decided ten years ago, it is unlikely that legal scholars would
have had much impact on the public discussion or understanding of the
case. Whilst there may have been a few letters or articles published in
newspapers, these would probably have had a limited impact. The speed
with which the case reached the Supreme Court would have seriously
limited the possibility for peer-reviewed contributions, which are already
made difficult in the course of litigation by the length of time between
24 PDaly, `Legal Academia 2.0 –New andOldModels of Academic Engagement and Influence'
(2014) < https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436600> accessed 10 August 2017.
221
2016–2017 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 8
submission and publication.25 The blogging around Miller allowed public
law academics to respond rapidly – but the format also allowed them to
respond at some length and in some detail, including replying to arguments
advanced by Counsel which – in another first – were made available by
the Divisional Court as daily transcripts published on the court website.
Likewise, the skeleton arguments for all parties were published on the
Internet prior to the SupremeCourt hearing. Thus, they became the subject
of immediate scrutiny by academics and others in online discussion.
Therewere at least two benefits brought by these developments in academic
legal discourse. First, and perhaps most importantly, those who wanted
to be informed about the legal debates had a source to which they could
turn. The numbers of those accessing the blog posts confirms that this
interest was not confined to legal academics and their students. The blog
posts were also read by the general public, keen to know the constitutional
issues being debated in the courts. And this interest extended to the media
– both in print and broadcast – which ran stories about the Miller case
that often included interviews with, or quotations from, those academics
blogging about the case. This opening-up of legal discussion is an almost
unequivocally good thing. This new transparency can enhance public
understanding of the courts and the operation of the constitution, and gives
resources to those outside of legal academia that want to engage in these
constitutional debates.
Secondly, the blogging informed the arguments of the barristers before
the courts – especially before the Supreme Court. Thirty-five blog posts
were put before the Supreme Court – of which twenty-nine were published
or re-published on the UK Constitutional Law Association Blog. The
arguments and positions of blogging academics also found their way into
the skeleton arguments on both sides. In its judgment the majority of the
Supreme Court recorded that it had been `much assisted' by the published
academic contributions since the Divisional Court's judgment was handed
down.26 These papers had, `resulted in the arguments advanced before
25 The Modern Law Review was able to publish three articles on the topic in its November
2016 edition by Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Robert Craig and Gavin Phillipson, however by
the time that these were published they had been superseded by the Divisional Court's
judgment. They nonetheless provided valuable contributions which were cited to the
Supreme Court. LordMillett published a piece on what he believed to be the `real question'
in the appeal to the Supreme Court from the Divisional Court's judgment inMiller in Vol 7
of The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, which was cited in argument to the Supreme Court
and adopted by the Government in its case: Lord Millett, `Prerogative Power and Article
50 of the Lisbon Treaty' in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 7:
2015 – 2016 Legal Year (rev edn, Appellate Press 2017) 190; UK Supreme Court (Transcript,
5 December 2016) <www.supremecourt.uk/docs/draft-transcript-monday-161205.pdf>
accessed 10 August 2017, 132-33.
26 Miller (UKSC) (n 3) [11] (LordNeuberger, LadyHale, LordMance, LordKerr, LordClarke,
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this court being somewhat different from, and more refined than, those
before that court.'27 It is clear from the majority's judgment as well as that
of the dissenting judges, that the large number of blog posts examining
the Divisional Court's judgment and the arguments advanced by the legal
teams on each side had been influential. Blogging functioned as a sort of
`crowd-sourcing' of legal argumentation. A far wider, and more diverse,
range of people was involved in the identification and criticism of possible
legal arguments than there has ever been before this case. By the time the
Supreme Court started its hearings, the legal reasons on which the decision
would turn had already been extensively scrutinised and debated online,
although, as we shall explain, the Supreme Court majority still managed
to surprise by emphasising a line of reasoning that had not been prefigured
in the academic debates.
Paul Daly has essayed the `emergent' new model of academic engagement
that was witnessed in theMiller case. According to this newmodel – which
Daly terms `Academia 2.0' – the ability of academics to set-out ideas and
engage in debates over the internet breaks down barriers between academic
lawyers and the wider community of internet users, which in the right
circumstances can facilitate academic contribution to the genesis and course
of litigation. AsDaly explains, the ability of academics to influence litigation
and court outcomes was demonstrated by the Obamacare case in the US, as
well in Canada, in the litigation in which PrimeMinister Harper's nominee
for the Canadian Supreme Court was found ineligible. In both cases, blog
posts and Internet posts may have shaped legal argumentation and may
have affected judicial outcomes.28 Miller is the first case in which this
phenomenon has been witnessed in the UK. It is unlikely to be the last.
2 Two Landmark Constitutional Cases
The Miller litigation resulted in two momentous decisions. The Supreme
Court's decision is, of course, the ruling that will now receive most
attention, but that decision built on a powerful judgment of the Divisional
Court.
2.1 The Judgment of the Divisional Court
The Divisional Court, constituted by the Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence
Etherton MR, and Sales LJ, delivered a unanimous and unequivocal
LordWilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge).
27 ibid.
28 Daly (n 24); National Federation of Independent Businesses v Sebelius 132 S Ct 2566 (2012);
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 [2014] 1 SCR 433.
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judgment in favour of Gina Miller and Deir Dos Santos. The Secretary
of State relied on the argument that the undoubted Crown prerogative
power to make and withdraw from treaties would remain in Crown hands,
absent direct and explicit statutory control, `even if its use would result in
a change to the common law and statutory rights.'29 He further submitted
that the language of the ECA 1972 exhibited no intention to confer rights
or keep Britain in the EU, and that the case of De Keyser's Royal Hotel30
contemplated the prerogative powers surviving unless excluded by express
statutory regulation, or the necessary implication of the scheme of the
statute.
The Divisional Court found for the claimants. The key infirmity in the
Secretary of State's position was that it gave insufficient weight to the
`background constitutional principles which inform the inferences to be
drawn as to what Parliament intended by legislating in the terms it did.'31
For a start, the 1972 Act was itself a statute of particular constitutional
significance, and must be read accordingly.32 Drawing on the emerging
jurisprudence on `constitutional statutes' the Court found that the 1972 Act
was `exempt from casual implied repeal by Parliament'.33 That made the
Government's claim that its legal effects could be removed through the
exercise of the prerogative particularly unattractive.34 TheDivisional Court
identified a number of rights that would be lost by the triggering of art 50 of
the TEU, and found that, `unless Parliament legislates to the contrary, the
Crown should not have power to vary the law of the land by the exercise
of its prerogative powers.'35 This constitutional principle, embodied in the
rules of the common law that determine the relationship between statute
and the prerogative, was decisive. Since it was `common ground' between
the parties that s 2(1) of the 1972 Act `would be stripped of any practical
effect' by giving notice under art 50 of the TEU, the conclusion followed
that there was no power to give notice.36 This conclusion was reinforced
by a careful reading of the 1972Act. Therewere eight discrete aspects of the
1972 Act – most notably its long title and the wording of s 2 and its heading
– that the Divisional Court found evinced a parliamentary intention that
EU rights shall take effect in domestic law and that this effect should not
be capable of being undone or overridden by action taken by the Crown in
29 Miller (EWHC) (n 2), [76], see further [75]-[81] (Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence Etherton
MR and Sales LJ).
30 A-G v De Keyser Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 (HL).
31 Miller (EWHC) (n 2), [82] (Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR and Sales LJ).
32 ibid [43]-[44], [82], esp [87]-[88].
33 ibid [88], citing Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB






exercise of its prerogative powers.37 The decision of the Divisional Court
rested on both the rights argument and the frustration argument: triggering
art 50 of the TEU would frustrate the purpose of the 1972 Act and, in so
doing, would also remove rights.
Given these reasons for the decision, it might be asked why the Divisional
Court felt the need to engage with the concept of constitutional statutes.38
The constitutional nature of the 1972 Act might not seem to be of direct
relevance: after all, the rules which determine the relationship between
statutes and prerogatives apply to any statute, whatever the subject matter.
The constitutional nature of the 1972 Act was significant, though, in
determining the impact of the exercise of the prerogative on that statute.
Following Fire Brigades Union, the Divisional Court determined that the
prerogative could not be used to strip a statute of effect.39 In the Divisional
Court's judgment, the discussion of constitutional statutes illuminated the
purpose and legal effect of the 1972 Act, and, further, supported the view
that the intended effects of a statute such as the 1972 Act should not be
construed in the narrow fashion contended by the Secretary of State.40
The Divisional Court wove the conventional legal principles represented
by the Case of Proclamations and Fire Brigades Union case together with the
jurisprudence on constitutional statutes. The judgment is compellingly
written, in admirable prose, and deserves to take its place as the companion
judgment to the longer andmore pluralistic judgment of the majority of the
Supreme Court.
2.2 The Judgment of the Supreme Court
The appeal to the Supreme Court was the first ever to be `leapfrogged' over
the Court of Appeal on grounds of national importance and it was the first
case in which the Supreme Court has sat as a panel of eleven judges.41
Fifty-seven barristers appeared for the various parties and interveners:
37 ibid [92]-[94].
38 When we wrote our blog post, we felt that emphasizing the constitutional nature of
the ECA 1972 would leave the argument open to the characterisation that it depended
upon the identification of the 1972 Act as a constitutional statute, when the nature and
implications of constitutional statues remains controversial. In our view, the argument
does not depend upon such characterization. We, therefore, merely noted in our blog post
that the constitutional nature of the 1972 Act supports the frustration argument that we
advanced.
39 Miller (EWHC) (n 2) [98]-[99] (Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR and Sales LJ),
citing Fire Brigades Union (n 6).
40 ibid [86]-[88].
41 This included all sitting Supreme Court Justices at that time. The power to leapfrog on
grounds of `national importance' is found in the Administration of Justice Act 1969, s
12(3A)(a). Though there have been other leapfrog appeals on the basis of different criteria,
this is the first to have done so by reason of being a `matter of national importance.'
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twenty-seven of them were Queen's Counsel, and there were several law
professors. The Governments of Scotland and Wales were represented,
as were several Members of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly.42
The judgment of the Divisional Court was upheld. The remainder of this
part of the article will examine the majority and dissenting positions on the
relationship between the 1972 Act and the prerogative power to give notice
under art 50 of the TEU, as well as the devolution issues raised by the case.
2.2.1 The majority judgment on the 1972 Act
The central conclusion of majority of the Supreme Court was that:
[B]y the 1972 Act, Parliament endorsed and gave effect to the
United Kingdom's membership of what is now the European
Union under the EU Treaties in a way which is inconsistent
with the future exercise by ministers of any prerogative power
to withdraw from such Treaties.43
This central finding was composed of three interconnected sub-arguments:
the sources argument, the rights argument, and the frustration argument.
The second and third of these are now familiar, but the first is not.
Though the rights argument and the frustration argument are reflected
in the reasoning of the Supreme Court, centre stage in its reasoning
is the emphasis placed on EU law as a `source' of law, which was not
reflected in the arguments of the parties to the case before it (though some
interveners posited that giving notice would lead to a change in the rule of
recognition).44 The sources argument is also not found, or at least, is not
made explicitly, in the reasoning of the Divisional Court: it is new to the
Supreme Court.
According to the majority, the `main difficulty' with the Secretary of
State's argument is that it `does not answer the objection based on the
constitutional implications of withdrawal from the EU.'45 It found that
exit from the EU would result in the removal of a source of law from the
domestic legal order, and this was not lawful absent legislative authority.
42 The Agnew claim included not only Steven Agnew MLA but Members of the Legislative
Assembly drawn from the Green Party, the Social and Democratic Labour Party, the
Alliance Party and Sinn Féin respectively; and such included three party leaders and a
number of former Ministers of the Northern Ireland Executive.
43 Miller (UKSC) (n 3) [77] (LordNeuberger, LadyHale, LordMance, LordKerr, LordClarke,
LordWilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge).





At the most general level, the majority found that `a major change to UK
constitutional arrangements can[not] be achieved by ministers alone; it
must be effected in the only way the UK constitution recognises, namely by
Parliamentary legislation.'46 The majority further found that `the loss of a
source of law is a fundamental legal change [...].'47 The 1972 Act provided a
new constitutional process formaking law in theUK, and thus it constituted
EU law and legal institutions as a new source of law for the UK.48
That the ECA 1972 brought a new source (or sources) of law into the
English legal system is uncontroversial, if we understand the idea of sources
in its regular sense – that is, as the incorporation of a new set of rules
and rule-making institutions into the system. Plainly, EU law is a source
of both legislation and judge-made law that has direct effect in UK law,
and several textbooks, including a leading one by Mark Elliot and Robert
Thomas, describe EU law as a source of law.49 Indeed, statutes that create
new sources of law are commonplace; for example, many local authorities
enjoy a limited power to make law and become `sources' of law in this sense.
Furthermore, one would expect that clear statutory intent would be needed
for such sources to be removed by executive action without the further
sanction of Parliament. However, parts of the majority judgment appear to
move beyond such an analysis, and hint at a more radical sense in which
European law is a `source' of law. The Judges present European law as
a direct source of law, emphasising its capacity to `override' national law,
and down-playing – though without denying – the role of the 1972 Act as
the basis for this capacity.50 It is the EU institutions that are the `relevant'
source of the law.51 Such statements are not of course inconsistent with
an understanding of the term `source' in the more limited sense previously
described; but, significantly, the comparison with delegated legislation –
46 ibid [82], see also [81], [83].
47 ibid [83], see also [61]-[67].
48 ibid [80] (`One of the most fundamental functions of the constitution of any state is to
identify the sources of its law. And, […], the 1972 Act effectively constitutes EU law as an
entirely new, independent and overriding source of domestic law, and the Court of Justice
as a source of binding judicial decisions about its meaning.').
49 Mark Elliot and Robert Thomas, Public Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 45 (indicating interna-
tional law as being `in some sense' a source of UK constitutional law); Peter Leyland, The
Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2012) 28-29. No-
tably, Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (8th edn,
CUP 2012) do not include EU law as a source but do include subordinate legislation, which
is also incompatible with the narrow reading of `source' adopted by Lord Reed in dissent.
Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing and Christopher Knight, Constitutional and Administrative
Law (16th edn, Pearson 2015) 11-18, do not single out EU law or delegated legislation as
sources of the constitution.
50 Miller (UKSC) (n 3), [61] (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord
Clarke, LordWilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge).
51 ibid.
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that is, a legislative acts done under authority of an Act of Parliament
– is expressly rejected.52 The majority says that unlike with delegation
legislation, there has been an `assignment of legislative competences' by
Parliament to the EU institutions.
A conservative reading of Miller – a reading that ties the case to past
jurisprudence – would treat the sources argument as a working-through
of the frustration argument. Like the Divisional Court's discussion of
constitutional statutes, the claim that the 1972 Act incorporates a new
source of law and a new set of legal rights into the into the domestic legal
systemdemonstrates that the triggering of art 50 of theTEUwould frustrate
the purpose of the statute and strip people of their existing legal rights.
Indeed, without doubt, the frustration argument remains at the core of the
majority's reasoning in the Supreme Court. The majority found that giving
notice under art 50 would be incompatible with the terms of the 1972 Act.
The provisions of the 1972 Act, `far from indicating that ministers had the
power to withdraw from the EU Treaties [...] support the contrary view.'53
Here again following the Divisional Court, the majority found that the long
title, the general scheme of s 2 of the 1972 Act, and the side-note to s 2
(`General Implementation of the Treaties') `points away from a prerogative
to terminate any implementation.'54 Indeed, as a general matter, they found
that the 1972 Act Parliament `endorsed and gave effect to the UK's future
membership of the European Union, and this became a fixed domestic
starting point.'55 Thus, the UK Government would be acting contrary to
the statutory purpose by taking the UK out of the EU. Furthermore, the
majority was not persuaded by the claim that since s 2 of the 1972 Act
envisages that the content of EU rights could vary `from time to time' the
arrangements under the Act must be viewed as contingent on membership,
rather than be understood as the parliamentary conferral of vested rights:
`A complete withdrawal represents a change which is different not just in
degree but in kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules
derived from EU law.'56 The majority, furthermore, held that whilst s 2 of
the 1972 Act envisages the rights of UK citizens changing under the Act as
EU law varies, it does not envisage the rights changing by way of executive
withdrawal from the EU.
In contrast to the majority's extensive discussion of the purpose of the 1972
Act, their discussion of the particular significance of the rights conferred








extensive debate before the Divisional Court as to what `category' of rights
would be lost by withdrawal from the EU and whether withdrawal would
in truth frustrate any rights that could not be replicated in domestic law,
such as working time rights of employees. Before the Supreme Court,
the Secretary of State did not challenge the Divisional Court's analysis of
the effect of withdrawal from the EU on rights,57 but sought to contend
that all rights given effect by the 1972 Act were inherently conditional
on membership. The majority expressly endorsed the Divisional Court's
conclusion that the loss of EU rights intended to be given effect by the 1972
Act represented `another' and `related' ground for holding that art 50 of the
TEU could not be triggered without an Act of Parliament.58 Nevertheless,
the majority considered that the rights reasoning did not go far enough
because the 1972 Act not only gave effect to EU rights but created an even
more fundamental constitutional change: a wholly new source of law.
As with the Divisional Court's discussion of constitutional statutes, the
SupremeCourt's discussion of the sources argument can be seen to reinforce
the frustration argument and is, as the majority itself said, related to
the rights argument. The majority reasoned that the 1972 Act created a
structure through which institutions outside of our constitutional order
were accorded the capacity to make law for the UK. The triggering of art
50 of the TEU would lead to the loss of this capacity, the loss of a source
of law, and – as a result – the loss of certain rights for individuals; but not
only rights, obligations and powers, and immunities and well: an entire
corpus of law, EU law. Triggering art 50 would deprive the 1972 Act of
its intended purpose by reversing a substantial constitutional change – the
creation of a new source of law – that was brought about by Parliament
in 1972. On this interpretation, rather than a discrete argument for the
conclusion reached by the SupremeCourt, the sources argument is an aspect
of the frustration and rights arguments. However, central propositions
in the majority judgment suggest a considerably bolder premise for the
decision, which is distinct from the frustration and rights arguments.
On this reading, themajority recognise a distinct, new principle of the com-
mon law, amounting to a broad demand that fundamental constitutional
changes in the UK can only be undertaken through statute, at least absent
clear words in a statute to the contrary. This reading of the judgment may
explain the efforts made by themajority to present EU law as a direct source
of law, onewhich cannot be compared to delegated legislation. Whilst there
may be a justification for developing such a new legal principle, it is not clear
that a case of this controversy was the occasion for it, above all when other
57 Miller (EWHC) (n 2), [57]-[66] (Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence EthertonMR and Sales LJ).
58 Miller (UKSC) (n 3) [83] (LordNeuberger, LadyHale, LordMance, LordKerr, LordClarke,
LordWilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge).
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grounds were sufficient to dispose of the appeal in a way that recognised
its constitutional significance. Miller is easily explicable on the grounds of
long-standing rules of the common law, and, as we have seen, these com-
mon law rules can be traced through the majority decision. The creation of
a new legal principle on top of this reasoning is, perhaps, an unnecessary
distraction, though it certainly adds to the interest and importance of the
Supreme Court's judgment.
2.2.2 The Dissenting Judgments
For reasons of space, we focus in this section on the judgments of Lord Reed
and Lord Hughes. Lord Hughes's short judgment is helpful in elucidating
an important aspect of the legal conundrum at the heart of the Miller
case. Lord Hughes posited two legal rules which apparently point in
opposite directions. Rule 1 is that the executive cannot change law made
by Parliament (or the common law) (i.e. effectively the rights argument
based on the Case of Proclamations); Rule 2 is that the making of treaties and
conducting foreign relations is amatter for the competence of Government.
In its submissions, the Government emphasised this latter rule and said –
basing itself on De Keyser's case – such a power could only be removed by
express words or necessary implication. However, in our view, the two
rules set up a false conflict. The second rule is not, and was never intended
to be, understood as permitting any derogation from the first rule. The
Government is free to act on the international plane only insofar as doing
so does not affect domestic rights. This point is central to understanding
the strength of the argument for Ms Miller. It was explained most clearly
by LordOliver in theTin Council case, `as amatter of the constitutional law of
the United Kingdom, the Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making
of treaties, does not extend to altering the law or conferring rights upon
individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they enjoy in domestic
law without the intervention of Parliament.'59 Save perhaps in relation to
certain acts done in war time, the royal prerogative does not empower the
government to abrogate or change existing statutory or common law legal
rights and obligations in the UK. Therefore, the rule that the government
can act on the international plane does not `pull in the opposite direction'
from the rule that government cannot change the law, because the former
rule merely describes a domain of Governmental freedom of action that
exists because it does not affect domestic legal rights.
In countries where written constitutions confer executive powers in certain
areas such as international relations there might be a genuine conflict




between two such rules, if the executive power is stated to be devoid of
any relevant qualification.60 Yet under the British constitution, there is no
such conflict. Furthermore, to say that theremust be positive parliamentary
intent found to exclude the prerogative is to get the matter the wrong way
around; rather, there must be positive parliamentary intent for executive
action to be allowed to abrogate domestic statutory or common law rights.61
Lord Hughes considered that which rule was to prevail depended on the
correct reading of the ECA 1972, and his Lordship agreed with the reasons
given by Lord Reed for concluding that the 1972 Act `was only ever to be
operative for so long as the UK was a member' of the EU.62 Hence, Lord
Hughes found that it was intended that it would `cease to operate' to give
effect to EU law rights and obligations if the UK ever left the EU.63 It is to
Lord Reed's judgment, therefore, that we must turn. And a crisp statement
of Lord Reed's key reasoning is easily found:
[T]he effect which Parliament has given to EU law [...] is
inherently conditional on the application of the EU treaties
to the UK, and therefore on the UK's membership of the EU.
The Act imposes no requirement, and manifests no intention,
in respect of the UK's membership of the EU. It does not,
therefore, affect the Crown's exercise of prerogative powers
in respect of UK membership.64
In Lord Reed's view, the reliance placed by the majority on EU law as
a source of law was misguided. His Lordship rejected the idea that EU
law was a source in the sense that to remove it would be to alter the
rule of recognition: `EU law is not a source of law of the relevant kind:
60 For related considerations, see eg Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations
and Cooperation and Others (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution
Intervening) (83145/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53; 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP). The North Gauteng
High Court found that though the constitution conferred executive authority to negotiate
and sign treaties, the constitutional requirement of parliamentary approval prior to
executive ratification of treaties also entails that such approval is required before giving
notice of withdrawal from ratified treaties.
61 The position is different where there are two overlapping powers, one prerogative and
one statutory and the question is whether the statutory power is exclusive. In such a
case, De Keyser holds that the prerogative is not ousted absent express words or necessary
implication (cf R v Secretary of State Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority
[1989] QB 26). The De Keyser case, decided at a time when courts more readily accepted
that statutes did not bind the Crown, may itself be open to question in modern times, but
it does not affect the result inMiller : cf De Keyser (n 30).
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that is to say, a source of law whose validity is not dependent on some
other, more fundamental, source of law but depends on the ultimate rule of
recognition.'65 For the reasons given in the previous section, we believe this
overstates significance of EU law as a source of law. There is nothing in the
majority argument that turns on using the term `source' in the narrow way
that Lord Reed finds `relevant', and nor can it be denied that EU institutions
generate enormous amounts of law that are immediately applicable and
override national law in the case of conflict. That the new source of law
depends on a statute – the 1972Act – for its legal validity does not prevent us
from identifying it as a discrete source of rights and obligations in UK law:
it is the statute that has brought this source into the system. The majority's
conclusions based on the frustration argument is not affected by LordReed's
rejoinder. Even though the domestic effect of European law depends on a
UK statute, it remains the case that triggering art 50 will lead to the removal
of this source from the English legal system. That will represent a major
alteration to the sources of domestic law.
Of the majority's argument that for EU law to cease to have effect in the
UK would be a `major change' in the UK constitution, Lord Reed found
that it depended on what one took the effect of the 1972 Act to be. It
depended on whether the ECA 1972 was understood to create new rights
and obligations, as the claimants contended, or merely provided a conduit
through which the Crown's treaty obligations would be given effect.66 In
his Lordship's view, `EU law's ceasing to have effect as a result of the UK's
withdrawal from the Treaties is something which follows from the 1972
Act itself, and does not require further legislation.'67 Lord Reed similarly
rejected the rights argument because the possibility under s 2 of the 1972
Act that rights would, in the language of the statute, change `from time to
time' shows, in his view, that Parliament recognised that rights given effect
under the Act `may be added to, altered or revoked without the necessity of
a further Act of Parliament […].'68 The so-called `vital difference' between
alteration and withdrawal, on which the majority judgment laid emphasis,
had `no basis in the language of the 1972 Act', according to Lord Reed.69
The frustration argument was also rejected for all the reasons given above.
65 ibid [224]. The reference here to the ultimate rule of recognition is to borrow from the
analysis of HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP 1994) ch VI. Under this analysis,
some rules of law have authority not because they are derived from a superior law or rule
that confers that authority on them, but merely because they are `recognised' by the law
applying officials as having such authority.
66 This rolls together two arguments that are presented in his judgment as alternatives at: ibid
[229]-[230] (Lord Reed).
67 ibid [230].




If the point of the 1972 Act was to create a conduit, but leave to the Crown's
treaty power the option of whether to connect it, then it is wrong to say
that the Crown disconnecting that pipe is contrary to the purpose of the Act.
The Act's legal effect was contingent upon separate and discrete executive
action. For that reason, the Ex p Fire Brigades Union case was inapposite and
the conclusion is only reinforced by theDe Keyser case, whichmakes it clear
that only direct statutory wording or necessary implication will be read to
oust the prerogative powers.
In our view, Lord Reed's dissent, though powerfully argued, is unconvinc-
ing. It requires us to take an artificial view of the 1972 Act, the purpose
of which, as the majority found, was to bring European Law into domestic
law and thereby to give effect to the UK's membership of the EU. It is com-
patible with the wording of the Act on only very a strained reading, and is
clearly incompatible with its spirit. There are no textual indications which
support it, and several textual indications, identified by theDivisional Court
and Supreme Court majority, which contradict it. The majority also took
the view, along with the Divisional Court, that given the constitutional sig-
nificance of the 1972 Act, the power for the executive to withdraw from the
EU would require clear statutory authority. The executive could not jus-
tify doing so without a further Act of Parliament, merely by invoking the
legislative silence on the issue. Interestingly, Lord Reed agreed with this
approach to statutory interpretation: `As the majority of the Court rightly
state […], the fact that a statute says nothing about a particular topic can
rarely, if ever, justify inferring a substantial change in the law.'70 However,
Lord Reed spun this the other way, reasoning that the absence of any ex-
press statutory term addressing withdrawal from the EU meant that it had
not disturbed what his Lordship described as a `fundamental principle', that
powers relating to the UK's participation in treaties `are exercisable by the
Crown.'71 However, this form of reasoning is open to the same criticism
as Lord Hughes' judgment, in that it assigns some positive constitutional
basis and force to the ability of the executive to act in the realm of treaty
making, rather than recognising, as Lord Oliver explained in the Tin Coun-
sel case, that this is a sphere of executive action which exists only because
and insofar as it does not affect domestic legal rights.
Notably, Lord Reed also endorsed the contention that there are `compelling
practical reasons' for leaving treaty making powers in the hands of the
executive, citing Blackstone's Commentaries.72 However, to use such a
proposition as the foundation for a statutory presumption favouring
70 ibid [203] (Lord Reed), citing [108] (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr,




2016–2017 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 8
executive power – one that would operate essentially in the way the
presumption in Ex p Simms does in favour of a construction of general
statutory provisions that avoids infringing human rights – would be
a mistake. There are, indeed, sound constitutional reasons for wide
administrative discretion in the area of foreign affairs, but there are
also sound reasons for wide discretion throughout the operation of the
administrative state. There is nothing special about foreign affairs that
distinguishes it, in this fundamental respect, from many other areas of
national life and law. Hence, to convert such a conventional position into a
presumption on par with the principle of legality in Ex p Simms, but one
pointing in the diametrically opposite direction, would have significant
implications beyond the field of foreign affairs to other areas where general
statutory terms impact on individual rights in areas of governance where
the executive justifiably is recognised as having a broad discretion in
exercising those power that it does have. The courts should not interpret
legislation in those fields so as to ensure executive power is maximised even
when it impacts on individual rights. It should be recalled that it was just
such an approach to legislative interpretation that led to the courts finding,
without any clear legislative basis for doing so, that the British Government
had power to intern British citizens in war time. The legislation had to
be read so as to maximise and not frustrate executive power in the field
of national security, an approach to statutory interpretation which was
subsequently followed by the majority of the House of Lords in Liversidge
v Anderson.73 We should be mindful, too, that legislative presumptions
operate in a constitutional environment in which a government seeking
to rely on a wide interpretation of a statute, but which is stopped by a
court from doing so, is able to ask Parliament to pass a bill conferring this
authority. On the other hand, a presumption that grants wide latitude to
the executive may lead to the conferral of powers which are in practice
nearly impossible for Parliament to remove. Such a finding would only
rarely be brought to Parliament's attention and, if MPs are unwilling to
allow theGovernment this power, the ability to initiate and enact restrictive
legislation without Government support is highly constrained. Thus, the
approach taken by Lord Reed, in our view, unjustifiably seeks to elevate the
constitutional truism that foreign affairs and treatymatters are the province
of the executive, to a principle of law which would be used to empower the
Government at the expense of Parliament and individual rights.
73 R v Halliday ex p Zadig [1917] AC 260 (HL); for criticism, David Foxton, `R v Halliday ex
parte Zadig in Retrospect' (2003) 119 LQR 455, 461-87. The approach to construction was
applied in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 (HL), by themajority to interpret Regulation
19B of the Defence of the Realm Regulations in manner that removed judicial supervision
of the reasonable of the grounds for internment during the SecondWorld War.
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Reflections on Miller
2.2.3 The devolution issues
A major difference between the Divisional Court and Supreme Court
hearings was the inclusion of the devolved regions in the Supreme Court
case.74 There was only limited academic discussion on the implications
of devolution before the Miller case, yet it was an important part of
the pleadings before the Supreme Court. The Governments of Scotland
and Wales intervened, and there were references from the courts of
Northern Ireland for clarification of issues live in proceedings there.75 The
submissions coming from these various parties were sophisticated, but two
central arguments emerged.
The first was that the devolution statutes contain provisions that make EU
law effective in the devolved regions, including empowering and limiting
devolved institutions.76 Giving notice under art 50 of the TEU would
deprive these of practical effect. Since these were also `constitutional
statutes', the arguments pertaining to the relationship between the ECA
1972 and prerogative powersmight apply to devolved arrangements aswell.
This argument was essentially a variation on the point raised on behalf of
Gina Miller, but made in respect of the devolution statutes.
The second argument turned on the Sewel Convention, the convention that
theWestminster Parliamentwill not normally legislate on devolvedmatters
without the consent of the devolved assemblies.77 It was argued that this
convention would be engaged by an Act of Parliament triggering exit from
the EU or another Act taking the UK out of the EU. Those raising the Sewel
convention before the court did not contend that it should be rendered
legally binding; whilst there is material fromwhich such an argument could
have been made, it would have been highly unlikely to succeed.78 The
best that could be hoped for was that the Supreme Court would issue a
declaration that the convention was engaged, on the basis that removing
EU rights, obligations and powers from domestic law would affect a major
alteration in devolved competences. That argument is not as ambitious as
it sounds given that s 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 amended the Scotland
Act 1998 to read in s 28(8): `it is recognised that the Parliament of the
UnitedKingdomwill not normally legislatewith regard to devolvedmatters
without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.' Parliament has, therefore,
translated the Sewel Convention into law. The Supreme Court was not
74 One case in Northern Ireland was decided just as the Divisional Court was composing its
reasons, and it was distinguished by the Divisional Court: Re McCord's Application [2016]
NIQB 85. It is a first instance court hearing for judicial review claims in Northern Ireland.
75 Miller (UKSC) (n 3) [126].
76 ibid [129]-[132].
77 ibid [136]-[151].
78 See NW Barber, The Constitutional State (OUP 2010) ch 6.
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asked to say that s 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 would be breached but that
the legislation would engage s 2, and the Sewel Conventionmore generally,
because it would constitute legislation concerning devolved matters.
The majority of the Supreme Court declined to answer the first argument,
and roundly rejected the second. The former, it felt, was not necessary
to decide in light of the success on the principal claims.79 The second
claim relating to the Sewel convention was rejected unanimously in strong
terms.80 It is basic constitutional law that a convention is political rather
than legal. And, the Court held, this basic presumption is not dislodged
by the act of putting the convention on statutory footing in s 2 of the
Scotland Act 2016. The use of the words `it is recognised' and `normally'
in the statutory formula, when combined with the basic principle of
non-enforceability, meant that the Sewel convention should be treated
as unenforceable and indeed non-justiciable (inappropriate for judicial
resolution).
The SupremeCourtmay have been too quick to reject both arguments. The
case for finding that the rights argument applied equally to the devolution
statutes seems quite hard to deny. To consciously forego judgment on
the issue fails to give recognition to the constitutional significance of
the devolution arrangements and of the importance, as a matter of both
law and principle, of any such finding for the devolved governments
and legislatures. We would also contend that the ruling on the Sewel
convention and in particular the effect of s 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 was
unnecessarily broad. Whilst it would have been a radical step for the court
to turn an apparent convention into law, the court could, following the
lead of the Canadian Supreme Court,81 have provided a declaration on the
scope of the convention. Asking a court to provide an interpretation of a
statutory clause – even if it is not legally enforceable – is well within the
judges' jurisdiction.
3 Conclusion
The decision in Miller was determined by the principle of representative
democracy that structures the UK's constitution, and which is instantiated
79 Miller (UKSC) (n 3) [130]-[132] (LordNeuberger, LadyHale, LordMance, LordKerr, Lord
Clarke, LordWilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge). In fact, the tenor of [131]-[132] is
that the majority was minded to agree with the submission that rights would be removed
but felt it unnecessary to so decide.
80 ibid [136]-[151] (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord
Wilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge), [177]-[178], [242] (Lord Reed), [243] (Lord
Carnwath), [282] (Lord Hughes).
81 Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753.
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in the common law rules regulating the relationship between statute and
the prerogative. Miller represented the application of pre-existing legal
principles to a novel set of facts in a uniquely sensitive and highly-charged
context. At the heart of the Miller decisions lies a simple legal argument:
the purpose of the 1972 Act was to give effect to EU law in domestic
law, and that rendering the Act nugatory by taking the UK out of the EU
frustrated the basic purpose of the Act. Indeed, on the strength of the fact
that EU rights were part of UK law, millions of people moved their lives
and livelihoods to the UK, and, domestically, millions of British citizens
have structured their lives on the assumption that they too could access
these rights. Those social facts, and those legal connections, helped convert
a dry and legalistic point about the relationship of statute and prerogative
into a sensational case, that grabbed the imagination and attention of the
general public as well as lawyers. The 1972 Act was nothing short of a
new constitutional settlement which brought EU law into domestic law
and gave effect to EU rights in our law. Viewing the Act in its broader
social and historical context reinforces the fundamental difference between
the evolution of EU rights (and obligations) and their removal altogether.
Anyone actually exercising such rights in the UK would recognise the
difference instantaneously. For them, the alterations to, and the evolution
of, EU law has been business as usual; but the complete removal of such
rights would be a matter of personal crisis (or, for some, triumph). Lord
Hughes andReed's judgments, exhibiting the strained artificiality of some of
the academic commentators that preceded them, view the 1972 Act as being
entirely neutral on this major constitutional point, and entirely agnostic
about whether EU rights should be effective in UK law. To regard the
purpose of the 1972 Act as being indifferent in this way seems to us to be
highly formalistic and unhistorical. The unanimous Divisional Court and
the majority of the Supreme Court reached the right answer.
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